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Human Rights and Genetic 
Discrimination: Protecting 
Genomics' Promise For Public Health 
Anita Silvers and Michael Ashley Stein 
T he potential power of predictive genetic testing as a risk regulator is impressive. By identifying asymptomatic individuals who are at risk of be-
coming ill, predictive genetic testing may enable those 
individuals to take prophylactic measures. As new thera-
pies become available, the usefulness of genetic testing 
undoubtedly will increase. Further, when a person's family 
medical history indicates a propensity towards a particular 
genetic disease, a negative test result may open up other-
wise denied opportunities by showing that this person has 
not inherited suspect genes. In the latter type of case, a 
negative test result may reassure the individual that pursu-
ing a particular course of action (such as planning a family 
or training for a job) is worthwhile, or may convince pro-
spective employers that the individual will be a serviceable 
employee. 
Concomitant with these benefits are prospective harms 
that can arise from the use of information derived from 
predictive genetic testing to discriminate against employ-
ees.1 For example, to mitigate responsibility for an 
employee's injury or disease, an employer might argue 
that the individual was. genetically disposed to such an 
outcome by, for instance, a gene for carpal tunnel syn-
drome, or the employer may fire an individual if testing 
reveals a genetic susceptibility to workplace toxins or to a 
genetic condition that results in disability.2 In general, as-
ymptomatic people who believe they will be denied 
opportunities, compensation, and benefits if classified as 
genetically flawed will adopt defensive strategies against 
being so categorized. The most obvious defense is not to 
be tested.3 Regrettably, in protecting themselves by evad-
ing testing, individuals relinquish the advantage of 
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prophylactic and therapeutic intervention. They also delay 
any gain of knowledge (for themselves or others) about 
their genotype by refusing to participate in research proto-
cols. Thus, fear of discrimination (whether or not factually 
justified) has the potential to block benefits that otherwise 
might be gained from genomic knowledge. As a conse-
quence, scientists like Dr. Francis Collins, head of the 
National Human Genome Institute, recommend strong le-
gal protections against genetic discrimination.4 
Nevertheless, effective fed~ral regulation specifically 
protecting individuals from genetic discrimination is almost 
nonexistent. Advocates for protection have sought mea-
sures that either protect against certain violations of 
individuals' privacy or that prohibit specified discrimina-
tory actions. As we show, however, each of these solutions 
contains a fatal flaw. Privacy-based protections seek to se-
quester genetic information, but they do not adequately 
address the practical realities of how genetic information is 
disseminated. Antidiscrimination mandates attempt to pro-
hibit certain actions based on genetic information, but do 
not address the practical realities of how discriminatory 
action is precipitated. Ultimately, both approaches leave 
many people who are genetically disposed to disease and 
disability, or have family histories of such dispositions, 
vulnerable to social threats that may prevent the realiza-
tion of the benefits genomics promises.5 
We argue in this article for a much broader approach, 
an equality-based protection similar to the bans against 
race and sex discrimination. In doing so, we identify some 
problems that have made current prohibitions against dis-
ability discrimination less effective than was originally 
hoped, and we show that the prevailing approach to pro-
tection against genetic discrimination is subject to similar 
weaknesses. In particular, we show that neither existing 
federal law banning disability discrimination nor proposed 
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federal genetic discrimination law protects asymptomatic 
individuals with genetic anomalies who pursue prophy-
lactic or mitigating measures. The diseases associated with 
these anomalies may never be expressed or, if expressed, 
may not manifest as unmitigatable functional impairments. 
Yet genetic anomalies may be used as proxies to disqualify 
their possessors from opportunity, as biological properties 
associated with race and female sex have been used in the 
past. We therefore advocate a novel civil rights paradigm 
that safeguards individuals from discrimination on the ba-
sis of genetic identity, as they now are protected from 
discrimination based on their identities with respect to race 
and sex. 
CRmQUFS OF ExisTING APPROACHFS To 
PROTECI1NG AGAINST GENETic DISCRIMINATION 
In the main, two lines of thought about the grounds for pro-
tection against genetic discrimination have been pursued. 
Initially, the appeal was to citizens' rights to privacy. More 
recently, antidiscrimination safeguards have been invoked. 
Privacy 
The privacy model has been variously advocated and 
interpreted by many commentators. As demonstrated by 
Anita Allen and Mark Rothstein in discussions of genetic 
privacy, the desire for "privacy" can be inspired by and 
encompass divergent values and goals, including moral, 
proprietary, and decisional ones.6 Pauline Kim and 
George Annas, for example, ground their respective ar-
guments for privacy protection in the value of protecting 
an individual's autonomy to control her own destiny.7 
These commentators advocate privacy-based protection, 
seeking, as a general matter, to sequester access to indi-
viduals' genetic information.8 
At least two areas of U.S. law speak to privacy rights. 
Constitutional law, in application of the Fouri:h, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments, emphasizes preserving individu-
als' control over intimate information affecting their personal 
identities, particularly as it relates to the development of 
the emotional, cognitive, and spiritual dimensions essen-
tial to autonomous beingsY Tort law also offers individuals 
some privacy protection by penalizing encroachment upon 
or revelation (or misrepresentation) of personal facts. As 
June Madiski has noted, the common law has long recog-
nized the right to be "let alone" from intrusion by others, 10 
especially in regard to those private affairs which comprise 
personal identity, where information is conceived to have 
been wrongly appropriated if disclosed for advantage with-
out the person's consent. Statute and precedent present a 
complex picture of the ways that various kinds of personal 
facts may or may not be constitutive of one's personal 
identity, and, as well, of the conditions under which 
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consent to disclosure may be explicitly required or instead 
presumed. By awarding damages for past violation of indi-
viduals' privacy rights, tort law helps protect their monetary 
interests but may be inadequate to preserve other inter-
ests, especially those related to individuals' dignity and 
autonomy.n 
Privacy rights also are protected by evidentiary privi-
leges, contract and property law, and federal and state 
statutes. Medical patients' privacy is covered by a patch-
work of federal and state provisions, including the 
accreditation standards for hospitals. 12 The Privacy Act of 
1974 limits federal agencies' use of information to those 
which are "relevant and necessary" for their authorized 
mandates, permits individuals to access their own records 
and to request emendations, and proscribes the disclosure 
of information to third parties. 13 On the state level, the 
1996 New Jersey Genetic Privacy Act makes genetic infor-
mation the patient's private property (regardless of who 
has paid for the genetic tests) and requires informed con-
sent to any disclosure of test results. 14 
Despite these foundations, privacy-based solutions to 
genetic discrimination that seek to sequester genetic infor-
mation do not effectively address the practical realities of 
how genetic information may be misused. First, in many 
businesses, individuals who administer health-care ben-
efits or manage health and safety programs also have 
responsibility for some aspects of managing personnel. In 
these circumstances, the expectation that employers can 
maintain a firewall so that information found in health-
care records never influences personnel decisions may be 
unrealistic. Second, when a proprietor waives a privacy 
right for one purpose, the information may in practice be 
used for another purpose, especially if, in the future, a 
genetic anomaly currently correlated with one condition is 
found to correlate with another. For example, individuals 
who provide DNA to be tested for susceptibility to heart 
disease could, years later, find that they have been dis-
missed from their employment as airline pilots because of 
new data that the gene has some expression for an early 
onset of Alzheimer's disease. Third, where more than one 
person has a property right in certain information, it is not 
clear whose interests have priority in respect to maintain-
ing control. For example, when test results for one family 
member yield information about another family member, 
it is unclear whether courts will defer to the individual 
who wishes to prese1ve privacy or to the one who will 
benefit from disclosure. Other considerations that may also 
warrant overriding individual privacy rights include threats 
to public safety and assertions of business necessity. 15 
It should also be noted that genetic information about 
an individual is discovered in several different ways. Al-
though informed consent for medical testing is in principle 
necessary, patients often are asked to consent only to con-
tributing a specimen or sample, or else to the use of their 
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body materials for certain panels of tests. Or they are in-
formed of the tests to be run without specifying what is 
learned from the tests. The physician may order the panel 
for one reason, which she discusses with the patient, but 
the entire set of test results becomes part of the patient's 
employment record. In all these cases, patients' consent to 
be tested might be construed to imply workers' consent to 
treat all test results as ordinary medical records that are 
available, under the usual conditions, to employers. 
Regulations proposed to control access to genetic in-
formation must specify what data will come under control. 
Yet there is no bright line dividing genetic from nongenetic 
information. A chance remark about family history, or a 
formal requirement to relate it, may reveal significant data. 
Information that ordinarily makes no reference to genetics 
may, in a particular context, be extrapolated to hypotheses 
regarding individuals' heightened susceptibility to genetic 
disease. Well-supported and ill-supported hypotheses may 
be equally provocative of adverse action, and therefore 
equally damaging to their subjects. It is impracticable to 
place an embargo on all information from which people's 
genetic conditions might be inferred. 16 
Antidiscrimination: disability discrimination 
Where the privacy model extends protection by sequester-
ing information, the antidiscrimination model assumes that 
such attempts may be unsuccessful, and consequently regu-
lates the uses to which genetic information may be put. To 
date, the most pertinent theoretical discussion has cen-
tered on application of the "regarded as" prong of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)17 to genetic discrimi-
nation. The premier proponent of this position has been 
Paul Miller, who, as a Commissioner of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), has also directed 
its practical application. 18 
Federal courts require individuals who hope to be safe-
guarded by the ADA to prove that they have disabilities. 
Being disabled means having "(a) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities of such individual, (b) a record of such 
an impairment; or (c) being regarded· as having such an 
impairment. "19 To establish a claim for protection based on 
being regarded as disabled, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that her employer mistakenly believed she had a physical 
or mental impairment which limited a major life activity, 
when she in fact had no such impairment. 20 As an example 
of such a mistake, consider an individual utilizing a lower 
leg prosthetic device to mitigate the impact of an amputa-
tion, but whose functional ability had not actually been 
impaired. Such an individual would be regarded as dis-
abled under the ADA if her employer nevertheless believed 
her to be limited in a major life activity, for example, walk-
ing or standing.21 
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Although the ADA does not specifically address ge-
netic conditions, there are reasons, according to Miller, for 
thinking that the "regarded as" prong is applicable to them. 
First, the congressional record offers some evidence of leg-
islative intent. During hearings, congress members 
characterized genetic discrimination as exhibiting the myths, 
fear, and stereotypes that historically have excluded people 
perceived as biologically anomalous from fair equality of 
opportunity.22 Second, citing the congressional record, the 
EEOC has offered policy and enforcement guidance state-
ments, as well as opinion letters, bringing actions arising 
from genetic information relating to genetic disease or dis-
abling conditions under the regulation of the ADA's 
"regarded as" criteria.23 In sum, the position adopted by 
the EEOC, as explained by Commissioner Miller, is that: 
[a] person is "regarded as" disabled within the 
meaning of the ADA, if a covered entity mistak-
enly believes an individual has a substantially 
limiting impairment, when in fact, the impair-
ment is not so limiting. Under such a theory, 
coverage for individuals with a genetic predis-
position would generally rely on demonstrating 
a mistaken belief concerning the major life 
activity of working.24 
Application of the ADA's "regarded as" prong to in-
stances of genetic discrimination is, however, fraught with 
difficulties. To begin with, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the ADA so as to limit the number of people who 
fall under its protection.25 Additionally, the Court has given 
clear warning that the deference traditionally granted to 
federal regulatory agencies will not always be extended to 
the EEOC's understanding of the ADA (which by inference 
includes its guidelines on genetic discrimination). 
Moreover, several defenses which have been success-
fully asserted by employers under the ADA in regard to 
conventional types of disabilities can be raised in response 
to genetic discrimination allegations. Employers can assert 
that potentially disabling conditions preclude workers from 
fulfilling "essential" job functions, thus banning them from 
ADA protection.26 Similarly, employers may aver that are-
quested accommodation would create an "undue hardship," 
and that as a result, the worker failed to satisfy the statu-
tory prerequisite of being "qualified" for that particular 
employment.27 Further, the employer may claim that when 
an adverse action is triggered by concern about an 
employee's future state (for example, about the costs 
incurred if the employee develops the genetic disease to 
which she is predisposed), the employee is not regarded 
as being currently disabled and therefore is not protected 
by the ADA. 28 The ADA also contains a semi-exemption 
· for insurance coverage, as a result of which employers are 
not required to offer any particular coverage to disabled 
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individuals so long as the coverage offered is equivalent to 
that of nondisabled people.29 Last, it bears noting that the 
ADA itself may not even be applied because employers 
may argue successfully (as they do in other antidiscrimina-
tion suits) that their employment decisions were based on 
factors other than those alleged.3° 
A significant impediment to the pursuit of ADA claims 
on the ground of genetic discrimination is the defense that 
the plaintiff poses a direct threat to others, a defense which 
has recently been expanded to include workers who pose 
threats to themselves. Although the paradigm application 
of the direct threat defense involves the potential for "sig-
nificant risk" to others - for example, the risk posed by 
food handlers with highly contagious conditions like ty-
phoid that are transmitted in food31 - the potential for 
expansion into the realm of genetic potential for risk is 
enormous. Employers could argue that an individual who 
currently does not pose a direct threat to others is a poten-
tial future risk. Consider, for example, the situation of an 
airline pilot with a genetic predisposition to Alzheimer's. 
For example, an employer might defend the exclusion of 
such a genetically atypical airline pilot on the ground that 
he posed a hazard to passengers because of his greater 
than species-typical potential for developing degradations 
of coordination and judgmentY Moreover, the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal 
unanimously upheld an EEOC regulation expanding the 
"direct threat" defense to authorize exclusion of an em-
ployee whose work could "endanger his own health."33 As 
a result, employers may deny employment opportunities. 
on the ground that work site conditions or job responsi-
bilities could make workers' own biological anomalies 
develop into pathologies or disabilities. The potential for 
success of the direct threat defense is great. 
Last, although enacted as a civil rights statute, the ADA 
has sometimes been interpreted (wrongly, in our view), 
by both courts and conunentators, as a specialized ben-
efits statute for enhancing the welfare of the disabled. On 
this interpretation, its application to genetic disoimination 
is even more tenuous.34 That is because, it will be argued, 
the class of individuals who have a greater than species-
typical likelihood of developing some genetic disease is 
very large. It is implausible to constme this class as being 
especially needy and therefore deserving of benefit'> not 
offered to other people.35 
Not surprisingly, then, almost no cases clearly charging 
genetic discrimination have been ftled by the EEOC. The most 
prominent (and only successful) one was a settlement in 
E.E.O.C. v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Co. In tilis 
case, however, the wrongs ti1e employer allegeclly conunitted 
included failure to obtain patients' infonned consent to being 
genetically tested.36 (A related suit, EEOC v. Woodbridge Cor-
poration, was clisnlissed by the court at ti1e sununary judgment 
stage on the ground that the employer did not regard the job 
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applicants as being disabled, despite their disposition to carpal 
tunnel injury, for they were still capable of perfonning other 
jobs at the same plant.3T) 
Even more problematic, however, is that, under cur-
rent interpretations, the ADA (even if successfully applied) 
bifurcates the population into protected and unprotected 
groups. The ADA applies only to those individuals who 
are seriously symptomatic, or to those who can show that 
they have been treated adversely because they are regard€d 
as seriously symptomatic.3R People with genetic anomalies 
which are not expressing, or may never express, are un-
likely to qualify for ADA protection. 
The case of Terri Sergeant 
The circumstances surrounding Terri Sergeant and her 
potential genetic discrinlination suit39 illustrate our point 
that neither privacy-based protections sequestering genetic 
information nor antidiscrimination mandates prohibiting 
adverse actions based on genetic disabilities, effectively 
protects the large group of presymptomatic individuals. 
Sergeant is an individual with a fanlily history of Alpha-1-
antitrypsin, an often fatal deterioration of the lungs. When 
asymptomatic, she tested positive for tile genetic disposition 
for tllis disease, wllich had killed her brother at age thirty-
seven. As a result of the test, her physician initiated preventative 
tllerapy that deters tile development of tile clisease and pro-
tects against lung infection. This treatment costs more than 
$45,000 annually but pemlits her to work and engage in all 
other life activities without linlitations. 
Sergeant worked for a firm that self-insured for em-
ployees' health insurance. During her employment, she 
had repeatedly received outstanding performance evalua-
tions and merit salary increases. In November 1999, seven 
months after her preventative treatment began, she received 
another excellent review and increase. One month later, 
after her employer was apprised of her medical treatment 
and the likely reason for it, her employment was tenni-
nated, and she lost her health and disability insurance. 
There is no certainty that Sergeant would have be-
come symptomatic even without the preventative therapy. 
Nevertheless, preventative intervention reduces or elimi-
nates her risk, and she remains able to perform activities 
like walking and breathing, major life activities that are 
severely compromised in symptomatic cases of Alpha-1-
antitrypsin. There is no reason to believe her employers, 
who observed her daily, regarded her as currently unable 
to perform these activities. 
The circular nature of her dilemma is clear. Positive 
genetic testing permits her to take preventative measures 
against the substantial limitations of major life activities 
that could result from Alpha-1-antitrypsin in the absence 
of medical prevention. The success of these measures, 
however, lessens her legal protection against losing her 
Tbe journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 
job and her medical benefits. Their effectiveness prevents 
· her being limited in major life activities and therefore re-
duces the likelihood that she will be, or will be regarded 
as, impaired. Ironically, people may have to forgo the 
medical benefits genetic information can bring if they are 
to be protected by the ADA from genetic discrimination. 
This catch-22 situation, which so adversely affects asymp-
tomatic and presymptomatic individuals such as Ms. 
Sergeant, is not addressed by existing statutory provisions. 
Antl~crlnrunation:genetic~crlnrunatlon 
Sergeant's story came to Congress's attention as the result 
of her testimony before the Senate Health Education 
Labor and Pension Committee. A bill intende'd to addres~ 
genetic discrimination independently of the ADA, H.R. 
602, is currently pending (in its fifth reincarnation) before 
Congress.40 Even if passed, however, people like Terri 
Sergeant will remain vulnerable to genetic discrimination 
because, while the bill incorporates elements of both the 
privacy and antidiscrimination models, certain situations 
that arise in regard to asymptomatic individuals continue 
to be ignored.41 Specifically, the Genetic Nondiscrimina-
tion in Health Insurance and Employment Act would 
prohibit employment discrimination in hiring, terms of 
employment, and the provision of health insurance en-
rollment, on the basis of genetic information. The proposed 
legislation prohibits employers and certain other entities 
from taking adverse action against prospective and cur-
rent employees based on information about genetic test 
results or the occurrences of genetic disease in family 
members.42 It does not cover other sources of informa-
tion about an individual's health.43 
As drafted, the legislation's protection does not extend 
to important kinds of information. Once again, the case of 
Terri Sergeant illustrates the problem. Sergeant's employer 
could have gained knowledge about her genetic condition 
from several sources, not all of which qualify as protected 
under H.R: 602. Data pointing to Sergeant's condition in-
cluded the history of her sibling's illness and death, medical 
appointments to treat chronic respiratory problems that 
Sergeant attributed to an allergy, positive genetic test re-
sults for Alpha-1-antitrypsin, and medical records and 
$45,000 annual bills for preventative treatment. H.R. 602 
would prohibit Sergeant's employer from basing an em-
ployment decision on the first and third items in this list 
but not on the second and fourth. Indeed, all the informa~ 
tion the employer needs to identify her genetic condition 
is manifested in the record of her prophylactic treatment. 
An Internet search can quickly identify the conditions for 
which the treatment is prescribed. 
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PRoPOsED APPROAOIES 
Analysis of Terri Sergeant's case reveals a difficulty in the 
application of antidiscrimination law to genetic discrimina-
tion, whether provided· by the ADA or by specialized 
legislation. This is the problem of determining who will be 
protected and who not, when no bright line separates vul-
nerable ~rom impervious, and deserving from undeserving, 
populations. The ADA and the proposed specialized legis-
lation each bifurcate the population into protected and 
unprotected groups. The ADA's umbrella covers people 
who are symptomatic or mistakenly regarded as symp-
tomatic. Specialized genetic protection is aimed at 
asymptomatic genetically anomalous individuals who in 
former times, could have escaped discrimination but V:,ho 
now can be identified through genetic testing. 
Whether an individual who is genetically disposed 
to a disease is symptomatic often is not very clear. For 
example, a person who finds herself under stress and 
forgetting things might describe these circumstances to 
a physician. Forgetting things is no strict indicator of 
Alzheimer's disease, as witness young parents who lock 
up their cars on sweltering summer days, forgetting that 
their infants are still inside. In the case we are consider-
ing, the physician, knowing that this patient's family has 
a history of early onset Alzheimer's disease, orders ge-
netic testing, which gives a positive result for a gene 
associated with Alzheimer's disease. 
· However, an examination of the patient's cognitive 
functioning, with attention to the cognitive deficits diag-
nostic of Alzheimer's, is inconclusive. Although no diagnosis 
of Alzheimer's can be made on the existing evidence, the 
physician starts the patient on donepezil hydrochloride as 
a prophylactic to delay cognitive impairment, just in case 
the patient's .memory problems signal the onset of 
Alzh . ' 44 I h' I e1mer s. n t IS case, an emp oyer who regards the 
employee as likely to develop Alzheimer's could claim to 
have based personnel decisions on inferences made from 
the unprotected parts of the medical record (the patient's 
report of memory problems and the prescription for 
Donepezil hydrocloride) but not from the protected parts 
(the genetic testing and family history). As the Sergeant 
case and this case both show, prescribing medication to 
ward off onset of disease symptoms in individuals whom 
genetic tests show to be at risk may be as revealing as the 
test results themselves. 
Individuals claiming harm specifically from genetic 
discrimination must establish that the adverse action oc-
curred prior to their being symptomatic and indeed, prior 
to the employer's imagining there is such a sign. Questions 
about whether an employer's decision was influenced by 
unprotected parts of the medical record, rather than by the 
results of genetic tests or by family history, may preempt 
bringing cases to trial. Because prophylaxis is not a 
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medical strategy specific to genetic disease, and prophy-
lactic prescriptions are separate from the protected record, 
individuals who use genetic information to pursue pre~ 
ventative measures to benefit their health may, in doing 
so, lose their legal recourse against genetic discrimination. 
Thus, the goal of genetic antidiscrimination law- namely, 
to free currently healthy citizens with anomalous genetic 
identities to improve their health through applications of 
genomic knowledge - may not be realized. 
In general, plaintiffs will find it difficult to demonstrate 
that genetic information, rather than some other kind of 
information, triggered the employer's adverse action. In 
this regard, legislation that counts action based on genetic 
information as discriminatory faces the same difficulty as 
legislation that attempts to block access to that informa-
tion. There is no bright line between genetic and nongenetic 
information, especially in cases of multifactorial disease. 
Consequently, protective approaches that focus on reduc-
ing the possibility that people will be targeted because a 
genetic identification of them is made can never be more 
than half-measures, as it is impracticable to specify all of 
the routes to such identification in legislation. 
The ADA has been read as extending civil rights protec-
tion to individuals whose physical or mental impainnents 
subs~'lntially limit their participation in major life activities, or 
who are so regarded, but as giving no protection to inclividu-
als who can adapt to or mitigate their impainnents sufficiently 
to engage substantially in such activities.45 On tl1e other hand, 
specialized legislation that targets genetic discrimination will 
protect individuals until they evidence limitation of major life 
activities, or some other observable sign of their propensity to 
or manifestation of genetic disease.'16 Here, the protected popu-
lation is almost a mirror (reverse) itnage of tl1e population 
protected by tl1e ADA, but once again individuals who take 
mitigating measures are unprotected. 
· Regrettably neither the prevailing interpretation of pro-
tection against disability discrimination, nor the most 
prominent current attempt to formulate a separate approach 
for protection against genetic discrimination, shields people 
who take mitigating measures to escape dysfunction. Fur-
ther, the lines drawn between protected and unprotected 
groups do not reflect the difference between people who 
can and people who cannot function successfully. Existing 
approaches to both disability discrimination and genetic 
discrimination thus fail in large part to reduce the costs of 
excluding otherwise productive citizens from equal op-
portunity if these citizens act to mitigate the effects of the 
biological anomalies on the basis of which they suffer dis-
crimination. Consequently, we propose a broader approach 
that in principle protects everyone equally, rather than lim-
iting eligibility for protection to individuals who have been 
identified as substantially limited in capability, or who have 
been identified as being at higher than species-typical risk 
of such limitation on the basis of genetic information alone. 
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Protecting individuals "on the 
basis of genetic identity" 
No matter what their race and sex, all citizens may, in 
principle, seek recourse through the law if they are harmed 
by race or sex discrimination. What would be required to 
take a similar approach and to extend genetic discrimina-
tion protection to the general population? . 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the key federal 
protection against bias because of biological atypicality, 
prohibits discrimination "on the basis of'' sex and raceY 
We recommend borrowing from Title VII jurisprudence by 
enacting an antidiscrimination mandate which prohibits 
· discrimination towards individuals on the basis of their 
genetic identity. Alternatively, Title VII could be amended 
to add this stipulation. This paradigm would permit plain-
tiffs to proceed regardless of the sources from which 
defendants' beliefs about their genetic identity derive -
for example, regardless of whether genetic or nongenetic 
information, confirmed or speculative claims about genetic 
determinism, evidence of prophylactic measures or of symp-
tomatic limitations prompted the action of which the plaintiff 
complains.4H 
In support of our approach, we argue that equality 
entails a methodological prohibition against the general 
characterization of members of some classifications, but 
not of others, in terms of the limitations of a subgroup of 
the classification. In doing so, we borrow from contempo-
raty constntctions of the classification of sex and race. Thus, 
for instance, we note that equal protection requires that 
women in general not be classified as unable to defend 
themselves because a subclass cannot do so unless men in 
general also are so chissified in recognition of the subclass 
of men who cannot do so.49 Nor does equal protection 
permit the social opportunities of people of a particular 
geographically-identified heritage, such as African-Ameri-
cans, to be limited because a subclass may not be positioned 
to realize them. 
Half a century ago, equal protection did not reach to 
women because, as a class, they were characterized as 
unable to defend themselves and others against rowdy or 
violent males, even though only a subclass of women was 
too weak to do so. 5° Today, the class of women generally 
is thought competent in this regard,51 although presum-
ably the existence of a subclass too weak to do so remains 
the same.52 Similarly, following the U.S. Civil War, African 
Americans "had to contend with claims, issued with scien-
tific certainty, that, however acculturated they were, their 
color was a visible marker for an inherent savagery. Jour-
nalists chided them for feeling superior to their scantily 
clad, undulating cousins dancing to 'tom-toms."'53 Today, 
the class of people who trace their ancestry to Africa gen-
erally is thought capable of behavior as civilized as that of 
people of every other heritage, nor is any variation of 
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dermal pigmentation imagined to dispose to, or protect 
against, an individual's acting savagely. 
Just as, in principle, everybody can be identified in terms 
of race and sex, everybody also has a genetic identity. We take 
a person's genetic identity to be constructed in terms of inher-
itable species-typical biological characteristics, and inheritable 
anomalous biological characteristics. We speak of "inheritable" 
rather than "inherited" characteristics advisedly in order to in-
clude the first generation of a mutation that might be inherited 
by future offspring. There are three reasons why "genetic iden-
tity" should be understood somewhat broadly here. First, in 
the future, biologists may discover additional mechanisms of 
biological inheritance that are not properly "genetic" but affect 
the inheritable constituents of people's identity. Second, mul-
tifactorial diseases for which there is a genetic disposition should 
be considered to affect an individual's genetic profile, even 
though nongenetic factors also come into play. Third, dis-
crimination protection should be available in cases of adverse 
actions prompted by mistaken beliefs that a characteristic is 
genetically based, not just in cases occasioned by accurate 
understanding of the mechanisms of biological inheritance. 
In current practice, individuals whose inheritable char-
acteristics dispose them toward a species-typical biological 
life course usually are thought of as having a normal ge-
netic identity, whereas individuals whose inheritable 
characteristics dispose toward an anomalous biological life 
course are likely to be assigned "non-normal" genetic iden-
tities. Individuals who have a genetic disposition toward 
disease, but whose biological life courses do not diverge 
markedly from species-typicality, nevertheless are likely to 
be labeled as "non-normal." Further, individuals whose 
biological life courses do diverge from species-typicality as 
a result of infection or accident, rather than inheritance, 
sometimes have been labeled with a genetic identity as a 
proxy for characteristics that are not, in fact, inheritable. 
Thus, for instance, offspring of families in which succes-
sive generations engage in disapproved behavior, such as 
having children out of wedlock, sometimes have been la-
beled as "feeble-minded" and have been sterilized to 
interrupt the transmission of the "disease."54 
For purposes of the law, we argue, the population of 
the legal classification of genetically anomalous people 
should be characterized not in terms of stereotypes but, 
instead, through empirical study of the relevant biological 
groups. This is the standard articulated in UAWv.johnson 
Controls, /nc,55 where the Supreme Court held that to jus-
tify the exclusion of women of child-bearing age from jobs 
involving lead exposure, the employer was required to 
show that the workers' "sex or pregnancy actually 
interfere[d]" with their ability to perform their jobs,56 in 
order to establish that belonging to the class of women of 
child-bearing age was a bona fide occupational disqualifi-
cation. Because Johnson Controls had not established 
this connection empirically, the Court reasoned that the 
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exclusionary fetal protection policy was driven by inde-
fensible self-serving motivations (for example, seeking to 
avoid tort liability).57 To prevent genetic anomalies from 
being used as proxies to disqualify their possessors from 
opportunity, employers would equally be required to prove 
that having a certain genetic identity constitutes a bone 
fide job disqualillcation by showing, empirically, that it 
manifests without exception as an unmitigatable dysfunc-
tion that actually prevents performing the job. 
As a practical matter, due to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,58 Title VII 
claimants must plead a prima facie case of discrimination 
to avoid dismissal at the summary judgment stage of pro-
ceedings. According to McDonnell Douglas (and its 
progeny), the level of proof required for a Title VII plain-
tiff, whether a woman or a person of color, to meet the 
burden of production is "minimal:"59 Moreover, case law 
applying proscriptions against discrimination on the basis 
of race and sex now proceeds from the initial presumption 
that the prevalent characteristic of all protected individuals 
is their competence to perform, with a subcategory of in-
dividuals within the classification who will be unable to so 
function.60 This initial presumption will either be borne out 
or disproved by empirical evidence when particular ac-
tions are challenged. · 
In line with our current treatment of women and ra-
cial minorities, the burden of proof in genetic discrimination 
cases should shift from requiring individuals who are 
anomalous to demonstrate that they can be competent and 
productive despite being anomalous to requiring whoever 
would exclude them from productive opportunity based 
on their anomalies to prove that they cannot.61 Such a pro-
scription would tailor genetic antidiscrimination protection 
to those instances when individuals have had their oppor-
tunities inequitably reduced because of stereotypic beliefs 
about the significance of their genetic identity. The pre-
sumption would be that members of the class of genetically 
anomalous people will remain competent and productive, 
although a subclass will not do so, rather than that class 
membership means future deficiency even though a (pos-
sibly very large) subclass may escape this fate. 62 People 
with higher than typical risk of genetic disease as a class 
would be presumed to remain viable employees, although 
some will not do so. We thereby would cease to use ge-
netic anomalies as proxies for performance limitations. 
Some might argue that being assigned a genetic iden-
tity is only peripherally like. being identified in terms of 
race and sex.63 Genetic risk might be thought to be more 
specifiable than risks associated with race and sex. In 
response, we point out that the attribution of risk associ-
ated with biological inheritance is no more specifiable in 
principle than that associated with race or sex. The chal-
lenge in all three domains is to guard against unconfirmed 
or poorly understood associations and to act only on 
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empirically well-verified, finely detailed ones. 
Like some assignments of identity in terms of race and 
sex, some genetic identities have been made especially 
vulnerable to adverse action based on pretexts and stereo-
types. Historically, impairments have served as proxies for 
genetic identities. For example, in the name of relieving 
future generations of so-called burdensome populations, 
California sterilized individuals with blindness or epilepsy 
during the 1930s. Only in a comparatively small number of 
instances are these conditions inherited, but courts permit-
ted California to ignore this distinction.64 
Attention to the social history of classifying people in 
terms of biological inheritance is important here. Histori-
cally, certain genetic identities have been characterized as 
burdensome to individuals and to society as a whole. Such 
attributions very often emerge from admixtures of little fact 
and much fiction. Thus, courts should carefully scmtinize 
genetic categorization to protect groups that historically 
have been constmcted as minorities subject to unequal 
treatment and denied opportunity on the basis of stereo-
typical assumptions about inheritable defects. To do so, 
jurists will need to have the benefit of extensive research 
from social and medical history, rather than be influenced 
by unsubstantiated proxies reflecting social convention. The 
task requires careful empirical study of the capabilities and 
limitations of people with genetic anomalies, and an un-
derstanding that the accuracy with which a genetic test can 
predict either the onset or effect of disease depends on 
many factors. These include variances in gene expression, 
a test's technical precision, the stability of linkage between 
genetic markers and suspect genes, the frequency of false 
positives and false negatives, and interference from ge-
netic recombination. With few exceptions, extrapolating 
from the presence of given genetic anomalies to a predic-
tion that the individual will develop the associated disabilities 
is statistically uncertain. For example, perhaps 50 to 60 
percent of women who inherit the "defective" mutations 
of the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene associated with cancer will 
develop breast or ovarian cancer during their lifetimes. 
Moreover, in circumstances involving these, penetrance 
estimates for breast cancer range from 36 to 85 percent, 
and for ovarian cancer from 10 to 44 percent. Thus, al-
though the presence of particular genes may identify 
individuals as belonging to an increased risk group (an 
extremely useful category from a public health perspec-
tive), the likelihood of those genes expressing themselves, 
if at all, is unclear.65 Legal theory would benefit from the 
development of better models for sorting, weighing, and 
applying, and for preventing the misapplication of, genetic 
information. How, then, can legal classifications do justice 
to the nature of genetic identity? 
We propose that classification of genetic identities be 
constmcted to acknowledge that genetic science supports 
judgments that are probable at best. This approach recog-
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nizes that in most cases genes associated with genetic dis-
eases have less than 100 percent penetrance and also that 
many genetic diseases are multivariant, meaning that sev-
eral factors must combine to induce the onset of symptoms. 
Individuals who are at higher than species-typical risk for 
onset are nevertheless ve1y often unlikely to become symp-
tomatic. Further, even individuals who are symptomatic 
may maintain their competence and p~oductivity, espe-
cially if mitigating measures for their disease can be found.66 
It follows that there is at least one other feature our 
model requires. The standard of proof for excluding 
individuals on the basis of their genetic identities must 
present a reasonably high bar. Defending the exclusion 
of individuals on the basis of their genetic identities must 
require far more than a mere showing that their propen-
sity to a genetic disease is more than species-typical. We 
propose a high standard of protection to align the law 
with current scientific realities regarding genetic knowl-
edge. With few exceptions, employers (and society at 
large) cannot predict accurately the effect DNA anoma-
lies have on particular individuals. Thus, in the absence 
of those rare instances of 100 percent penetrance where 
it can also be demonstrated that the individual can no 
longer perform her job functions, the presumption must 
remain that members of the class of genetically anoma-
lous people will remain competent and procluctive.67 
Placing the hurdle so high for legitimating exclusion from 
employment gives courts a clear standard that they can 
enforce when faced with the difficult issues raised by 
genetic discrimination. For any level of penetrance be-
low 100 percent, employers will be unable, given current 
scientific knowledge, to prove an unexceptionable con-
nection between an individual's genetic identity and her 
inability to perform the social function of work. 
Parenthetically, our proposal does not take the thesis 
of genetic exceptionalism as a premise. In most versions, 
genetic exceptionalism involves a claim about how ge-
netic information is different from other information. 
Commentators such as L1inie Friedman Ross, Gil Sonia Suter,69 
and others70 who either support or reject the doctrine of 
genetic exceptionalism argue either that protection against 
genetic discrimination requires specially targeted legisla-
tion because of the special characteristics of genetic 
information, or else that familiar broad approaches to pro-
tection will suffice because genetic information introduces 
no new problems. We agree with genetic exceptionalists 
as to the especially problematic character of genetic infor-
mation, but we argue that no advantage is gained by 
characterizing it as unique. 
The issue of personal and social cost 
We also do not argue for the abolition of any use of geneti-
cally informed medical information in employment 
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decisions. In the future, more and more medical informa-
tion will have a genetic component. Instead, we take issue 
with distorting such information into proxies, based upon 
empirically unfounded stereotypes that motivate the gen-
eral exclusion of people with genetic differences regardless 
of competence or qualification. 
Denying individuals work on the basis of their genetic 
identities may seem, from an individual employer's per-
sonal point of view, to be statistically rational because it 
reduces the chance of hiring and training people who sub-
sequently manifest dysfunctions and either require a 
disability-related accommodation or increase insurance 
costs.71 Similar arguments about their burdensomeness used 
to be rolled out to defend excluding women from desir-
able workplaces. Nevertheless, it is neither statistically 
justifiable nor in the interests of the collective social good 
to keep productive individuals out of the economy and 
thereby to require that public resources be devoted to sup-
porting them while they themselves are prevented from 
being productive. 
The view that few people warrant being protected 
and that discrimination protection should therefore be nar-
rowly targeted, appears to emerge from concern about the 
costs of covering a broad range of individuals. For ex-
ample, Colin Diver and Jane Cohen maintain that banning 
genetic discrimination within the employment markets 
would "cause significant welfare losses due to the distor-
tion of allocative efficiency."72 They adopt a neoclassical 
model of the labor market, one which presumes that vol-
untary exchanges between willing and informed individuals 
are "the paradigm of efficiency-enhancing transaction."73 
Consequently, prohibiting employers from obtaining and 
acting on information about their employees' genetic iden-
tities is thought to cause unjustified "significant efficiency 
losses" by preventing them from properly assessing (and 
avoiding) the supposed higher costs of those conditions.74 
Diver and Cohen's assessment fails for several rea-
sons. Primarily, they make presumptive errors regarding 
tl1e accuracy (and thus rationality) of predictive testing. 
Their argument stands up only if genetic screening can 
accurately predict whether an anomalous gene will ex-
press a debilitating condition and also correctly assess 
whether and to what extent each individual with the gene 
will be functionally impaired. Available scientific evidence 
about current and potential accuracy of genetic testing in-
dicates that this is rarely the case.75 
Of course, courts have authorized employers to ex-
clude employees on the ground that their past actions (for 
example, working under the influence of alcohol) may be 
used as a proxy for future behavior, but this line of argu-
ment cannot convincingly be extended to authorize the 
use of proxies for future performance in circumstances 
involving genetic discrimination. The analogy fails because, 
by its very nature, genetic discrimination is not prompted 
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by an employee's past record of impaired performance 
and therefore cannot be defended on the basis of expecta-
tions that the future will resemble the past. Unlike the 
formerly inebriated employee, the genetically atypical but 
asymptomatic worker has no history of genetically related 
impaired performance to give her employer a basis for 
expecting inadequate execution of the job. 
Diver and Cohen propose that "armed with genetic 
test results and corresponding epidemiological data on the 
correlation between genotype and phenotype, employers 
may be able to improve the quality of the predictions they 
can make about the two determinants of job performance: 
intensity and quality of effort."76 They also suppose that 
"genetic information may someday provide a more n;:li-
able basis for measuring deficits in job-relevant skills that 
can be corrected by the design of training programs."n Iri 
other words, by administering medical tests, employers 
could determine whether medicating, re-educating, or fir-
ing a worker who cannot execute job tasks is the optimally 
effective approach. As is characteristic of such discussions 
about permitting or prohibiting medical information to in-
fluence employment decisions, these authors deny that they 
are embracing genetic determinism. Equally characteristi-
cally, they fail to provide an alternative model which would 
support claims to predict the intensity and quality of indi-
viduals' job performance on the basis of inherited 
characteristics of their phenotypes. 
Yet, even if predictive genetic testing could make these 
prognostications, Diver and Cohen also err in their asser-
tion that economic efficiency mandates the allowance of 
genetic discrimination within the labor market. Strong policy 
reasons, in fact, militate against such a conclusion. Every-
one is potentially vulnerable to genetic discrimination 
because we each have some atypical or anomalous genes 
that may, in future, become suspect as new scientific knowl-
edge increases the pool of individuals believed to be at 
heightened risk of one or another genetic dysfunction. 
Consequently, society's interests in bringing about the most 
productive overall arrangement of its citizens override in-
dividual employers' interests in reducing the risk that their 
particular cohorts of workers will be less net-productive. It 
also bears repeating that the considerable public invest-
ment in genomic research is aimed at securing a public 
benefit by improving the long-term health and consequently 
the productivity of the population. Individual employers 
who create an environment in which employees fear ge-
netic testing risk are sacrificing this investment's return. 
Acknowledging genetic difference 
Many commentators who consider the implications of 
genetic difference label genetic differences as diseases rather 
than regarding these differences as variations which some-
times indicate when certain individuals may be at greater 
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risk of disease?8 In so doing, they import a criterion of 
genetic normality which, in a thoughtful article published 
in 1995, Susan Wolf termed "Geneticism. "79 Wolf cautioned 
that approaches to genetic discrimination may mistakenly 
focus on individual acts of discrimination rather than on 
the practice that promotes discrimination, namely, "creat-
ing genetic categories, actively looking for any kind of 
information about people in order to sort them into those 
categories, and harboring attitudes and prejudices that 
motivate such behavior."80 She believed that formal equal-
ity theory wrongly requires groups manifesting differences 
to be treated as if they l~ad none of these differences. Thus, 
she argued, when applied to genetics, antidiscrimination 
policy cannot help but presume that "there is such a thing 
as a 'normal' genotype, and that the goal is to change the 
treatment of people who deviate."81 In reality, however, 
there is no biological underclass. "There is nothing neutral 
or scientifically 'real' about identifying a genetic nonn ... if 
no one actually possesses this fictive 'normal' genotype, it 
is completely unclear what it means to treat someone as if 
they did have it."82 
Wolf argued that as a society we must not be misled 
into thinking that a strategy which failed in regard to sex 
discrimination - namely, attempting to assimilate mem-
bers of a subordinated group to the dominant group -
will work for genetic discrimination.83 By reifying the prop-
erties of the dominant group into "a norm that does not 
exist," assimilation serves to "merely entrench genetic bias."84 
Rather, we must abandon the stereotype that individuals 
with genetic variations are deviant, abnormal, or defective, 
rather than simply variant. 
We agree with many of Wolf's assertions and take no-
tice of her concerns. We nevertheless are more cautious 
than she about the usefulness of jettisoning equality as a 
value. We do not believe that equality-based paradigms 
necessarily impose the characteristics of the dominant or 
most populous group on other groups as norms or stan-
dards. Indeed, as we have argued, equality invites a 
methodology that acknowledges the differences between 
groups but eschews unfounded inferences based on these 
differences. 
In sum, we do not object as strongly as Wolf to "see-
ing people as their genes"85 because we think it possible 
for justice to acknowledge differences in genetic identity 
without using "genetic notions to privilege some individu-
als and subordinate others."86 Broadly, constructing 
classifications on an equality basis means that no one may 
be treated with less favorable presumptions, or be forced 
to bear a heavier burden of proof, by virtue of being as-
signed to a group that is thought to be biologically atypical. 
Such an equality-based approach to classification addresses 
the concern that characteristics associated with one ge-
netic class become a standard for members of other classes. 
On this approach to equality, characteristics of the 
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members of one genetic classification may not be made into a 
standard or nonn for other classes. Consequently, on this ap-
proach no particular genetic identity is privileged. 
CoNCLUSION 
We have argued for creating protection against discrimina-
tion "on the basis of genetic identity" for everyone, rather 
than only for "qualified individuals" who are symptomatic 
to the point of being disabled, or who have positive results 
of predictive genetic testing but are not symptomatic. Ev-
eryone has a racial and a sexual identity, and a genetic 
identity as well. Further, everyone is genetically anoma-
lous in some way. Everyone exhibits some differences from 
genetic species-typicality because species-typicality is as 
much an idealized constmction as the idea of the "average 
person." Given these considerations, equality-based pro-
tection against genetic discrimination, with a scope similar 
to that for race and sex discrimination, is needed by every-
one alike. 
What medicine will discover about the problems at-
tendant on each individual's genetic configuration, and 
which genetic configurations any employer may read as 
being proxies for unsuitability, is, at present, a lottery. Yet 
medical research reveals more and more every clay about 
using genetic information beneficially to prevent or delay 
the onset of genetic conditions that may be disadvanta-
geous. The population of the group that can take such 
mitigating measures is growing fast and growing large. 
Excluding this group from social opportunities cannot help 
but be enormously costly to the group's members, to soci-
ety, and, as well, to our faith that science can improve our 
lives. To save genomics, the major scientific achievement 
of our era, from occasioning such lamentable outcomes, 
we have proposed an approach to protect the people who 
have the most both to lose and to gain from genomics by 
protecting everyone alike. 
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